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Abstract. We identify two distinct themes in social science modelling.
One, more specific, approach is that of social simulation which addresses
how behaviour of many actors can lead to emergent effects. We argue
that this approach, while useful as a tool in social science policy devel-
opment, is fundamentally constrained due to the fact that its models are
developed within the society they are supposed to model. Alternatively,
the second theme looks to take a more holistic view by taking inspira-
tion from systems sociology. This approach looks to build societies from
the bottom up and may allow us to generate new perspectives in social
theory.
1 Introduction
Understanding and predicting the future of human society is a problem of stag-
gering complexity. Our level of understanding of the basic unit of society, the
human being, is far from complete, let alone the collective interactions and trans-
missions of information between the 6 billion individuals that live on our planet.
The mind boggles over the potentials for chaotic effects and intractable non-
linearities in this vast system.
That said, the problem of how life has evolved on that same planet would
seem also to be one of insurmountable complexity if it weren’t for the theories
of Charles Darwin [1]. Perhaps there is hope for a theory in social science of
similar explanatory power to evolution: one that does not fully explain society,
but provides us with a holistic framework to push forward our understanding of
society – in a similar way that evolution does for biology. This is the problem at
hand, the development of a fundamental theory of social science.
The only sensible way we may approach such a problem is by using the
best tools available in the most appropriate manner. We propose that computer
modelling gives us the freedom of abstraction and the power of the study of
non-linear mechanisms that will be vital for this endeavour.
This paper looks at the current literature surrounding social simulation to
attempt to formulate the role computer simulation should play in working to-
wards fundamental theories of social science. From our review, we outline and
distinguish two main themes in the computer modelling of social systems: so-
cial simulation and systems sociology. One key common feature of both these
modelling themes is that both focus on producing emergent macro-level effects.
The distinction we develop between social simulation and systems sociology
is based on the application and approach of these two themes. The application
of social simulation models is through the guidance of social policy. Such models
are often linked, or intended to be linked, to empirical data. As such social
simulation models are bottom up in their application. Systems sociology models
however are top down in their application – they are intended to push forward
social science and its paradigms.
When we consider the approach of the two themes, they take the opposite
roles to those taken in their application. Social simulation models take a top
down approach on human behaviour, identifying a specific class of behaviour and
predicting macro-level patterns. We argue that it is the very specificity of this
approach that restricts its usefulness in creating a new social theory. In contrast,
systems sociology modelling takes a bottom up view, starting with building
blocks of social behaviour and attempts to form meaningful and recognisable
social structure. Unlike the social simulation approach, the building blocks are
not defined with any predetermined interactions.
In many ways this looks analogous to the perspectives of evolutionary bi-
ology and artificial life – with evolutionary biology concerning itself with mi-
croevolution in specific biological systems and artificial life concerning itself with
macroevolutionary theory from a more general perspective. However, evolution-
ary theory was founded on a generalisation from observances from specific sys-
tems from the Galapagos islands [1]. We argue that specific social systems are
not likely to generalise into a fundamental theory for social science in this way.
Being human beings, and therefore part of the system being modelled, we are
not able to look at our society from the outside in the way we may look at
nature. We propose that we require the input from grown artificial societies to
give us new perspectives on our own society.
The next section introduces key literature in the field of social simulation
and criticises social simulation from the perspective outlined in this Introduc-
tion. Following on from this a new perspective derived from systems sociology
is introduced. Finally the two themes are compared in more detail before the
paper is concluded.
2 Social simulation
This section on the social simulation stream focuses mainly on the work of two
seminal social science modellers – Schelling and Cederman. It starts by critiquing
a famous case study: Schelling’s model of residential segregation and its impact
upon the development of social simulation. Following this, we consider a broader
picture of the stream looking at Cederman’s three types of social simulations.
Finally, we look at some of the relevant criticisms of social simulation seen in
the current literature.
2.1 Case study: Schelling’s segregation model
Schelling’s well-known ‘chequerboard model’ of residential housing segregation
has proves an interesting example of the power of the social simulation theme in
certain aspects of the social sciences[2]. He sought to confirm his suspicion that if
the racial makeup of a given area was critical to an individual’s choice of housing,
then even populations of individuals tolerant to mixed-race environments would
end up segregating into single-race neighbourhoods. To this end, he devised a
simplistic model of two populations placed on a chequerboard, with each agent
on the board given a very simple rule: if the number of agents of a different ‘race’
in its immediate eight-cell neighbourhood exceeded a certain critical threshold,
the agent would become ‘unhappy’ and move; otherwise, the agent would remain
in its current position.
Schelling’s model supported his initial hypothesis, proving that even if the
agents were given a high level of tolerance for other agents of a different ‘race,’ the
agents would end up segregating themselves into separate neighbourhoods. The
model also illustrated a deeper point: large-scale factors such as socio-economic
or educational differences between different ethnic populations could not explain
the generally puzzling phenomenon of residential segregation. Indeed, without a
greater insight into the preferences and thought processes of individuals within
a given population (their ‘micromotives’), some critical aspects of this social
problem may elude the researcher.
Despite its apparent simplicity, Schelling’s model provides an important illus-
tration of the potential power of the social simulation theme. The chequerboard
model provides only the barest of motivations for each agent in the simulation,
and yet the results are very applicable to more complex theories of the residential
segregation phenomenon. As he states, a model ‘can be a precise and economical
statement of a set of relationships that are sufficient to produce the phenom-
ena in question, or, a model can be an actual biological, mechanical, or social
system that embodies the relationships in an especially transparent way, produc-
ing the phenomena as an obvious consequence of these relationships’ [3][p. 87].
Schelling’s model shows the power of this transparency, demonstrating a clear
relationship between the simple micromotives driving an agent’s movement be-
tween neighbourhoods and the resulting segregation.
Perhaps most importantly, Schelling’s model succeeds due to its obvious qual-
itative similarity to the problem of residential segregation: one can see the effect
of varying levels of tolerance in these agents by simple visual examination, as the
agents begin to cluster into separate neighbourhoods of their own accord. While
Cederman and many others acknowledge that social simulation models can be
difficult to analyse, models of this type which illustrate important social con-
cepts simply could in fact be much easier to effectively ‘analyse’ through these
qualitative similarities than more detailed models which aim for social realism.
In fact one might argue that such a perspective echoes the techniques of much
of social science.
While Schelling’s model was accepted as a remarkable illustration of a sim-
ple principle regarding the large-scale effects of individual housing preferences,
some modellers sought to create a more ‘realistic’ Schelling-type model which
could incorporate socio-economic factors as well[4–6]. Given the accepted com-
plexity of residential segregation as a social problem, and the new insight into
the effects of individual preference illuminated by Schelling, models incorporat-
ing both Schelling-style ‘micromotives’ and large-scale social factors were seen
as a potential method for examining the interactions between these two levels
of social structure, something that was very much lacking in Schelling’s original
formulation.
However, even increasing the complexity of Schelling’s rather elegant por-
trayal of this particular societal problem cannot solve a fundamental problem
of this approach. Human society by its very nature is a complex system, incor-
porating as it does the collective interactions and transmission of knowledge of
many millions of individual actors in concert. Those interactions and retained
societal knowledge can in turn influence members of the society at large, and as
a society continues to evolve its past history can exert a tremendous influence
on its collective future decisions, making human society heavily path-dependent
(see[7] for one example of this phenomenon).
With this in mind, while agent-based models following Schelling’s example
can provide remarkable insight into the emergence of social phenomena within a
certain limited scope, models of this type are inherently limited in their theoreti-
cal application by their specificity. As we move into our discussion of Cederman’s
contribution to social simulation, we will examine these potential methodological
difficulties in greater detail.
2.2 Cederman’s three types of social simulation
Lars-Erik Cederman has been one of the most prominent proponents of agent-
based modelling within the political sciences. His own work appears to have
substantial roots in the social simulation mould described above, with a more
detailed focus on specific aspects of modern political structures [8]. Far from
confining himself to a singular mode of enquiry, however, Cederman has devel-
oped a theoretical framework of three types of social models in an attempt to
outline how a number of potential methods might contribute to the development
of social science as a whole [9].
Type 1 models in Cederman’s framework focus on behavioural aspects from
human society. By implementing a behavioural aspect at the micro-level in the
model, macro-level, or emergent, conclusions can be drawn. For example, Axel-
rod’s work has aimed to show the emergence of cooperation, and by using the
iterated prisoner’s dilemma showed that cooperation is possible in social settings
as long as the interactions of the involved agents are iterated and that agents
are capable of remembering previous actions [10].
Cederman identifies Type 2 models as those which attempt to explain the
emergence of particular configurations in a model due to properties of the agents
involved[9]. Cederman’s later simulations, for example, focused on issues such
as nationalist insurgency and state formation and stability using a framework
in which agents within the simulation were assigned specific properties that
influenced the resultant distribution of resources and information [11, 12]. Ian
Lustick’s Agent-Based Identity Repertoire Model (ABIR) in which agents were
provided with potential cultural ‘identities’ similarly aims to demonstrate the
emergence of clusters of these identities through properties of the agents and the
changes resulting from their local interactions [13].
Finally, Cederman identifies Type 3 models as being perhaps the most am-
bitious: these models attempt to model both the agents themselves and their
interaction networks as emergent features of the simulation[9]. He cites the field
of artificial life as one likely to inform this area of computational work in political
science, given that ALife focuses on such emergent features. He also acknowl-
edges that some overlap can occur these three types of models; for example, a
Type 1 model may stray into Type 3 territory by allowing agents more lati-
tude in choosing interaction partners, thus allowing for an interaction network
to emerge from the system. He argues that such models may provide very power-
ful tools for the political scientist, allowing for potentially profound conclusions
to be drawn regarding the development of political institutions. This approach
does seem most methodologically difficult, however, as the already significant
abstractions necessary to create Type 1 or Type 2 models must be relaxed even
further to allow for such ambitious examinations of emergent features in social
systems.
2.3 Criticisms of social simulation
From our perspective of attempting to develop a social theory, we present some
criticisms of social simulation. These help to elucidate the path we expect social
simulation to take in the future. We can then put that into context within our
main distinction.
Criticism of agent-based models in political science has come from a number
of different areas, but many of those criticisms focus on the difficulty of making
sensible abstractions for social and political structures within such a model. One
can view potentially all of scientific enquiry as reflecting the inherent biases
of the experimenter, and this problem of inherent theory-dependence is even
more acute when constructing simulation models [14]. While even abstract ALife
models may reference the real-life behaviour of natural biological systems, and
the wealth of related empirical data, political models do not necessarily have
that luxury. Highly complex social structures and situations, such as Cederman’s
models of nationalist insurgency and civil war [11, 12] involve further layers of
abstraction, often involving factors which do not immediately lend themselves
to quantification, such as cultural and national identities.
In addition, sociological theory is notoriously difficult to formalise, incorpo-
rating as it does a number of both higher- and lower-level cognitive and be-
havioural interactions. In fact, sociological theory may not benefit from the mi-
cro/macro distinction of levels of analysis that benefits researchers of evolution
and other large-scale processes [15]. These interacting social levels cannot be
clearly differentiated into a hierarchy of processes, making simulation a very
difficult, and highly theory-dependent, exercise.
Of course, with such complex phenomena contributing to the results of a
social simulation, finding an appropriate method of analysing those results be-
comes a very real concern for the modeller. Donald Sylvan’s review of Cederman’s
Emergent Actors demonstrates this common complaint levelled at agent-based
models in the social sciences; he urges readers to note carefully the lack of data
in its conventional sense throughout Cederman’s work [16].
As Sylvan points out, Cederman’s ‘data’ only relate to the interactions of
virtual states in an idealised grid-world; applying such data to real-life political
events or transitions seems suspect at best. The levels of complexity at work in
large-scale political events may be very difficult to capture in an agent-based
model, and knowing when to draw a specific conclusion from a model of such an
inherently difficult-to-analyse situation is a thorny issue.
While there is a potential for social simulations to illuminate the emergence
of certain properties of political structures, the difficulty in connecting these
abstracted simulations to real-world political systems is significant. Weidmann
and Gerardin[17], with their GROWLab simulation toolkit, have attempted to
sidestep these concerns by making their framework compatible with GIS (geo-
graphic information system) data, in order to allow ‘calibration with empirical
facts to reach an appropriate level of realism.’
Putting this into context, the need for an empirical perspective inherently
restricts the scope of social simulation models. While such a perspective allows
for models to have potential relevance to more conventional means of social-
science enquiry, this modelling methodology still exists within a preconceived
framework of societal interaction, lacking the more external perspective required
to develop a fundamental social theory.
Out of Cederman’s 3 modelling types, Type 3 models appear to be the most
likely to provide a means to draw broader conclusions about the development
of societies given that the agents are much less constrained in their interactions
than in Type 1 and Type 2 methodologies. However, even models of this type
begin with fundamental assumptions: about how these agents will behave, and
what sort of interactions might develop. Still we find ourselves striving for a
more fundamental perspective, one further removed from an artificially-imposed
social framework. We look to systems sociology.
3 Systems sociology
As we have seen, the advent of social simulation has proved influential in the so-
cial sciences, provoking new questions regarding the origin and nature of society.
While Schelling’s segregation model demonstrates the potential impact of social
simulation, it also illustrates the inherent difficulties involved in generalising the
conclusions drawn from a social simulation. More generalised models of society
as alluded to by Cederman’s Type 3 categorisation may provide a means for
investigating aspects of society which elude the empirical data-collector and in
turn inform our search for a fundamental social theory, but in order for this to
occur we need to establish a method of examining society on a broad theoretical
scale through simulation.
The well-known social systems theory of Niklas Luhmann provides one ex-
ample of an attempt to develop an understanding of the foundations for social
behaviour. Luhmann classifies social systems as systems of communication which
attempt to reduce complexity by presenting only a fraction of the total available
information [18].
One of the fundamental issues facing the systems sociology theorist is solving
the problem of double contingency, an issue Luhmann describes as central to
the development of social order. Put simply, if two entities meet, how do they
decide how to behave without a pre-existing social order to govern their actions?
How might these entities decide to develop a common means of interaction, and
through those interactions develop a shared social history?
As Dittrich, Kron and Banzhaf describe [19], Luhmann described a method
for resolving this contingency problem which was far more elemental than previ-
ous approaches, relying as it does on ‘self-organisation processes in the dimension
of time’ rather than through more standard social processes. The entities in ques-
tion would perform initial contingency-reducing actions during an encounter to
allow for each to develop an understanding of the expectations of each party in
the interaction.
In Luhmann’s view, the social order develops as a consequence of these
contingency-reducing actions on a large scale. As elements of the developing
society develop their expectations about the social expectations of others (de-
scribed as ‘expectation-expectation’ by Luhmann), a system of social interaction
develops around this mutual social history. This system then produces social in-
stitutions which can further influence the development of the social order. These
social institutions perform a similar function by reducing the amount of infor-
mation disseminated amongst the members of a society, essentially providing
contingency-reducing services on a much larger scale.
Agent-based models in the context of ALife have certainly proved useful in the
examination of other autopoietic systems; however, recent attempts to formalise
Luhmann’s theories into a usable model, while producing interesting results,
have highlighted the inherent difficulties of encapsulating the many disparate
elements of Luhmann’s theories of social systems into a single model [20].
4 Evaluation
Given the outlines of social simulation and systems sociology, this section aims
to examine the specific contrasts between these two approaches. By comparing
the methods and aims of these methods, we posit that the systems sociology
approach presents a promising avenue for developing fundamental social theory
through simulation.
4.1 Social simulation vs. systems sociology
As we can see from Luhmann’s analysis, while there may indeed be a lack of
‘data’ inherent to the study of artificial societies, there still exists a theoreti-
cal framework for understanding the fundamental mechanisms which drive the
creation of a larger social order. While some social simulation researchers may
seek to strengthen their models through establishing direct connections with
empirically-collected data from social science, the systems sociology perspective
could provide a different path to more useful examinations of human society.
The social simulation stream is oriented towards specific elements of social
behaviour: simulations of cooperation [21], nationalist insurgency [8] or the spa-
tial patterning of individuals or opinions within a society [13]. Social simulation’s
stronger links with empirical data may make validation of such models much eas-
ier, but further restricts the domain of those models to focus on social problems
for which usable data exists. Given the difficulties inherent in collecting social
science data, these problems tend to be a subset of those social problems for
which models could prove potentially illuminating.
It is the very restriction into particular domains which prevents the social
simulation approach from reaching a more general perspective. It is constrained
by approaching social phenomena from the top down. These actual top-down
approaches are necessarily rooted in the societies they model. In essence, looking
for a feature in society and then attempting to reproduce it in a model is not
sufficient to develop a fundamental theory.
In contrast, the systems sociology stream abstracts outside of the standard
view of society. Luhmann’s perspective aims to describe interactions which can
lead to the development of social order, in a sense examining the development
of human society through an ‘outside perspective.’ Luhmann essentially moves
beyond standard sociology, attempting to describe what occurs prior to the ex-
istence of social order, rather than operating within those bounds as with social
simulation. By viewing society from its earliest beginnings, prior to the existence
of any societally-defined modes of interaction and communication, the systems
sociology approach hopes to develop a theoretical understanding of the funda-
mental behavioural characteristics which lead to the formation of social order.
In many ways this approach is reminiscent of the ALife approach to modelling
‘life-as-it-could-be’[22]; the systems sociology perspective leads us to examine
society-as-it-could-be.
4.2 The philosophical difficulties of systems sociology
While the external and abstract perspective offered by systems sociology is ap-
pealing given our desire to develop a fundamental social theory, removing our-
selves so completely from the conventional empirical perspective carries its own
pitfalls. Of course, given that we would not be constructing models with the
specificity inherent in the social simulation approach, concerns related to vali-
dation and connection with empirically-collected data would not be of any great
import.
However, as Silverman and Bullock describe, developing such broad theories
through simulation can carry with it a great deal of philosophical baggage, as in
the case of strong ALife [14]. The strong ALife perspective, in which modellers
justify their examinations of digital organisms by maintaining that those digital
organisms represent a new form of life in the digital substrate, could provoke dif-
ficult questions for the systems sociology simulator. Are these artificial societies
mere models of societies, or are they bona fide digital cultures in their own right?
Are these simulations worthy of attention, or are they merely representational
oddities with no direct relation to the development of human society?
Within the systems sociology perspective, however, this modelling approach
seeks not to create society but to replicate its beginnings. By allowing agents
to construct their own social order, we may be able to observe the micro-level
interactions which lead to macro-level social constructs, and do so without a pre-
existing framework that guides those initial forays into communication. Without
question this approach lends itself to difficult philosophical questions, and given
the complete separation from conventional empirical social science these ques-
tions are even more significant. However, fundamentally this approach brings
us full-circle once more to Schelling: we seek models which display a qualitative
similarity to our current understanding of social order. If our simplistic com-
putational agents can develop characteristics reminiscent of a society, then we
move one step closer to understanding the fundamentals of human society, in
the same fashion that Schelling’s model provided a novel view of the problem of
residential segregation.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have reviewed the state of the art literature in the field of
social science modelling. Distinguishing between social simulation and systems
sociology has illuminated the shortcomings of social simulation for developing
broad theories in social science.
While the production of a fundamental theory of social science is clearly
a long way away, the approaches developed through the systems sociology ap-
proach should at least be able to play an instructive or forming role in the de-
velopment of social theory. Computer models that are at first very complex are
still mathematical constructs and may well be simplified to explicit mathemat-
ical models which form competent explanations [23]. By taking this bottom-up
approach of building new societies, while maintaining a top-down motivation,
new directions can emerge in future modelling endeavours.
Acknowledgments: Thanks to Takashi Ikegami and David Hogg.
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